Introduction
If a Quality of Service (QoS) dimension is supported, then applications and/or users can request or specify a level of service for one or more attributes of this dimension, and the underlying QoS control mechanism should be capable of entering into an agreement to deliver those services at the requested levels.
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) refers to the ability to provide security services according to user and system preferences and policies. This way security and security requests can be managed as a responsive "service" for which quantitative measurement of service "efficiency" is possible. The enabling technology for both QoSS and a securityadaptable infrastructure is variant security, or the ability of security mechanisms and services to allow the amount, kind or degree of security to vary, within predefined ranges [1] .
In previous work [2] [3] we have described how variant security can be offered and presented to applications and users in an organized manner. Two abstractions were introduced:
• an operational mode parameter, Network Mode, which represents the influence external conditions and network status could have on the security policy and security services applicable to the task: for example under certain conditions, an administrator may be willing to accept more (or less) security for a given application. Example values for this parameter are: normal, impacted, emergency.
• a Security Level parameter, which represents the choices available to users for the security variables within the value ranges that the policy permits for this Security Level. Example values for this parameter are: "high", "medium", "low".
The selections for the Network Mode and Security Level parameters are mapped to detailed mechanism invocations via a translation matrix.
As a proof of concept we want to demonstrate how an underlying specific security mechanism can be modulated to provide different levels for security in response to QoSS requests from users. In the next paragraphs we present our demonstration of QoSS awareness for IPsec. In the demo QoSS conditions are linked to IPsec, so that we can adjust the kind of security services provided to applications according to QoSS "handles", like the network mode and/or the security level.
In section 2 we provide some IPsec background and describe how QoSS notions can be linked to this security mechanism. Section 3 gives a brief description of the demo's functionality. Section 4 discusses the IPsec's Security Policy Database and how to put rules into it. In sections 5 and 6 we discuss Internet Key Exchange daemon's configuration and policy issues. Section 7 presents the functionality of the QoSS management module. Display of traffic data and of established security parameters is discussed in sections 8 and 9. Section 10 contains a detailed list of demonstration steps and files.
We've included in two Appendixes some OpenBSD specific information we considered useful for reference purposes. Appendix A contains installation guidelines and Appendix B information for setting up a Certificate Authority and generating keys and certificates.
It should be noted that for our demo we use the IPsec implementation of OpenBSD version 2.9.
The IPsec protocols themselves do not include an approach for managing the policies that control which host is allowed to establish SAs with another host and what kind of characteristics the SAs should have. We are using the OpenBSD's implementation of IPsec. This implementation addresses the SA management problem by including a trust management system, KeyNote, and providing an additional check in the IPsec processing: it makes sure that the SAs to be created agree with a local security policy (that can be expressed in the trust management system's language) [5] [6] [7] .
When IPsec SAs are established between two entities wishing to communicate, they are used until their negotiated lifetime expires (if the SAs are not for some reason violently interrupted/discarded). But the characteristics of the negotiated SAs cannot respond to dynamic modifications of the environment's security requirements, for example they cannot adapt to changes in threat conditions, critical time transmissions, and network congestion/traffic.
To have a QoSS aware IPsec, we enable the IKE daemon to negotiate SAs, and enable the Trust Management System to enforce local policy for them, in accordance with the system's QoSS parameters (network mode, security level). Also if there is a change in a QoSS parameter, currently active SAs must be renegotiated to conform to the current set of security requirements (as expressed by the local policy).
In Figure 1 we can see the components for a QoSS aware IPsec, which will be described in detail in the following paragraphs. The QoSS Management Module, which we have added, is responsible for fetching the current selections for the network mode and the security level and updating the IKE daemon's configuration data and KeyNote's local security policy. Furthermore it signals the IKE daemon to use from then on the new configuration data and local policy for SA negotiations, to remove currently active SAs (if any) and to notify the peer's daemon that these SAs are no longer valid, so that renegotiation of SAs can proceed [8] . 
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Demo Overview
In our proof of concept demonstration, the IPsec processing for three specific applications varies in response to a Security Level QoSS parameter. We display responsiveness to a system status change by adjusting the values of security variables, like encryption algorithm used for ESP processing and authentication algorithm used for AH processing [8] .
We have three example applications in our system: finger, telnet and ping. In the paragraphs below we describe our security policy requirements for each of them.
• ping does not utilize any security services
• telnet may use the confidentiality service provided by the ESP protocol of IPsec. One of the security attributes for which we have choices is the encryption algorithm, it could be any of the: DES, 3DES, RC4, IDEA, CAST, BLOWFISH, 3IDEA, or AES.
Our security policy could say that we can only utilize these algorithms: DES, 3DES, AES and a further refinement in the policy, that takes into account the notion of network modes, could say: So for the sake of simplicity we assume that our system is in Impacted Mode and we apply different IPsec processing to the applications in response to the Security Level parameter, as seen in Table 1 : we apply no IPsec processing to the traffic of any of the applications when the Security Level is Low. For Medium security, finger traffic is authenticated with HMAC-MD5 and we encrypt telnet traffic with DES. If we switch to High security, finger traffic is authenticated with HMAC-SHA and we encrypt telnet traffic with 3DES. "The SPD must be consulted during the processing of all traffic (inbound and outbound), including non-IPsec traffic. In order to support this, the SPD requires distinct entries for inbound and outbound traffic. An SPD must discriminate among traffic that is afforded IPsec protection and traffic that is allowed to bypass IPsec. This applies to the IPsec protection to be applied by a sender and to the IPsec protection that must be present at the receiver. For any outbound or inbound datagram, three processing choices are possible: discard, bypass IPsec, or apply IPsec. The first choice refers to traffic that is not allowed to exit the host, traverse the security gateway, or be delivered to an application at all. The second choice refers to traffic that is allowed to pass without additional IPsec protection. The third choice refers to traffic that is afforded IPsec protection, and for such traffic the SPD must specify the security services to be provided, protocols to be employed, algorithms to be used, etc.
[…]
"Specifically, every inbound or outbound packet is subject to processing by IPsec and the SPD must specify what action will be taken in each case. Thus the administrative interface must allow the user (or system administrator) to specify the security processing to be applied to any packet entering or exiting the system, on a packet by packet basis." [4] The SPD can be thought of as similar to a packet filter where the actions decided upon are the activation of SA processes [9] . In OpenBSD it is implemented as an extension to the routing table (Figure 2 ). Changes to the SPD can be made manually through the ipsecadm utility. Furthermore, the IKE daemon can cause modifications to the SPD. In both cases the PF_KEY API is used [10] . Allowed modifiers are: -src, -dst, -proto, -addr, -transport, -sport, -dport, -delete, -in, -out, -deny, -srcid, -dstid, -srcid_type, -dstid_type, -use, -acquire, -require, -dontacq, -permit, and -bypass. The netstat(1) command shows all specified flows. Flows are directional, and the -in and -out modifiers are used to specify the direction. By default, flows are assumed to apply to outgoing packets. The kernel will attempt to find an appropriate Security Association from those already present (an SA that matches the destination address, if set, and the security protocol). If the destination address is set to all zeroes (0.0.0.0) or left unspecified, the destination address from the packet will be used to locate an SA (the source address is used for incoming flows). For incoming flows, the destination address (if specified) should point to the expected source of the SA (the remote SA peer). If no such SA exists, key management daemons will be used to generate them if -acquire or -require were used. If -acquire was used, traffic will be allowed out (or in) and IPsec will be used when the relevant SAs have been established. If -require was used, traffic will not be allowed in or out until it is protected by IPsec. If -dontacq was used, traffic will not be allowed in or out until it is protected by IPsec, but key management will not be asked to provide such an SA. The -proto argument (by default set to esp) will be used to determine what type of SA should be established. A bypass or permit flow is used to specify a flow for which IPsec processing will be bypassed, i.e packets will/need not be processed by any SAs. For permit flows, additional modifiers are restricted to: -addr, -transport, -sport, -dport, -in, -out, and -delete. A deny flow is used to specify classes of packets that must be dropped (either on output or input) without further processing. deny takes the same additional modifiers as bypass" [11] .
In our demonstration we use the file vpn28_ah_a (Figure 3 ) to put the rules into the SPD. This script must be executed on the initiator's side before traffic from the applications is generated, otherwise no IPsec processing will be applied to that traffic. It establishes four flows:
• One pair for telnet traffic, that mandates ESP IPsec processing for incoming and outgoing telnet packets.
• One pair for finger traffic, that mandates AH IPsec processing for incoming and outgoing finger packets.
In both cases, traffic from these applications will not be allowed in or out until it is protected by IPsec.
For traffic of any other application to be subject to IPsec processing, a similar pair of flows should be established. Since no rule for ping is present, it will be allowed to bypass IPsec. By issuing the command netstat -rn -f encap we can observe the routing tables (-r option) and more specifically, the ones related to IPsec (-f encap option).
These are the rules that we have added to the SPD ( Figure 4 ). 
Configuring the IKE Daemon
The IKE daemon isakmpd is the key exchange and SA negotiation mechanism for IPsec. It automatically manages the exchange of cryptographic keys that would otherwise have to be manually managed with the ipsecadm utility. isakmpd daemon is used when two systems need to automatically setup a pair of Security Associations (SAs) for securely communicating using IPsec. IKE operates in two stages:
Phase 1 (Main or Identity Protection Mode) -"the two IKE daemons establish a secure link between themselves, fully authenticating each other and establishing key material for encrypting/authenticating future communications between them. This step is typically only performed once for every pair of IKE daemons".
Phase 2 (Quick Mode) -"the two IKE daemon create the pair of SAs for the parties that wish to communicate using IPsec. These parties may be the hosts the IKE daemons run on, a host and a network behind a firewall, or two networks behind their respective firewalls. At this stage, the exact parameters of the SAs (e.g., algorithms to use, encapsulation mode, lifetime) and the identities of the communicating parties (hosts, networks, etc.) are specified. The reason of existence of Quick Mode is to allow for fast SA setup, once the more heavyweight Main Mode has been completed. Generally, Quick Mode uses the key material derived from Main Mode to provide keys to the IPsec transforms to be used. Alternatively, a new Diffie -Hellman computation may be performed (significantly slowing down the exchange, but at the same time providing Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS))" [12] .
isakmpd.conf is the configuration file for the isakmpd daemon managing security association and key management for the IPsec layer of the kernel's networking stack and it's typically placed in the /etc/isakmpd directory [13] . The file is of a well known type of format called .INI style. This format consists of sections, each beginning with a line looking like:
Between the brackets is the name of the section following this section header. Inside a section many tag/value pairs can be stored, each one looking like:
Tag=Value It should be noted that some parts of the IKE daemon's configuration are auto-generated. Some predefined section names are recognized by the daemon, voiding the need to fully specify the Main Mode transforms and Quick Mode suites, protocols and transforms in the isakmpd.conf file:
For Main Mode {DES,BLF,3DES,CAST}-{MD5,SHA}[-{DSS,RSA_SIG}]
For Quick Mode
QM-{ESP,AH}[-TRP]-{DES,3DES,CAST,BLF,AES}[-{MD5,SHA,RIPEMD}][-PFS]-SUITE
All auto-generated values can be overridden by manual entries by using the same section and tag names in the configuration file.
For more details on what each tag name means, [13] and [9] should be consulted. Of special interest though is the Default-Phase-2-Suites tag. This tag describes a list of Phase 2 suites that will be used when establishing dynamic SAs. If left unspecified, QM-ESP-3DES-SHA-PFS-SUITE is used as the default. From this list the set of proposals for SAs that the initiator's IKE daemon sends to the other daemon is formed.
In our QoSS demo we want a different list of Phase 2 suites to be proposed to the other IPsec node, for medium and high security level (for low security level no IPsec processing is required by our policy). So we are using a predefined set of alternate IKE configuration data and local security policies that describe the characteristics we want our SAs to have for each security level and we make active the proper isakmpd.conf file through our QoSS module. The different IKE configuration data that we are using can be seen in Figures 5 and 6.
The main difference of these files is at the Default-Phase-2-Suites tag. The detailed breakdown and description of the suites is not necessary for the ESP suites used, since they are part of the auto-generated configuration. Only values overriden are needed to be present. The AH suites we use though should be explicitly defined (auto-generated info does not include them). Generally it is suggested as a good practice to fully describe the proposed suites in the isakmpd.conf file, to be sure of the various values used.
#isakmpd.conf.medium The configuration file for the IKE daemon of the responder can be seen in Figure 7 , where descriptions of various suites are kept for illustration purposes (it's not necessary to have all of them in the file).
[General] Listen-on= w. Peers authenticate each other through a pre-shared secret. Certificates could also be used (see Appendix B for some info). In that case the transform suite used for Phase 1 (Main Mode) should change to 3DES-SHA-RSA_SIG for example, and the Authentication tag should be removed.
The lifetime of the Initiator's proposals is 1 hour. This way, issues like expiration handling and re-initiation of negotiations from any of the two peers were not addressed. Further experimentation is needed.
Enforcing Policy with KeyNote Trust Management System
KeyNote, a trust management system [6] , is used in OpenBSD for enforcing the local policy that controls which host is allowed to establish SAs with another host and what kind of characteristics the SAs should have, whereas, the SPD is used for selecting traffic that needs IPsec processing and possible peer negotiation. IKE is used for performing that negotiation. When two IKE daemons negotiate for establishing an SA, the initiator sends across proposals for the SAs he is willing to establish. As mentioned in [12] "IKE proposals are "suggestions" by the initiator of an exchange to the responder as to what protocols and attributes should be used on a class of packets. For example, a given exchange may ask for ESP with 3DES and MD5 and AH with SHA1 (applied successively on the same packet), or just ESP with Blowfish and RIPEMD-160. The responder examines the proposals and determines which of them are acceptable, according to policy and any credentials. The goal of security policy for IKE is thus to determine, based on local policy (provided in the isakmpd.policy file), credentials provided during the IKE exchanges (or obtained through other means), the SA attributes proposed during the exchange, and perhaps other (side-channel) information, whether a pair of SAs should be installed in the system (in fact, whether both the IPsec SAs and the flows should be installed). For each proposal suggested by or to the remote IKE daemon, the KeyNote system is consulted as to whether the proposal is acceptable based on local policy and remote credentials (e.g., KeyNote credentials or X509 certificates provided by the remote IKE daemon)".
The local policy is contained in the isakmpd.policy file, which is typically placed in the /etc/isakmpd directory. isakmpd.policy is simply a flat ascii file containing KeyNote policy assertions (more details on the syntax of this file can be found in [12] , [6] ).
The responder selects a proposal, the first one from the list of proposals that are sent to him that conforms to his local policy (as expressed in isakmpd.policy). He sends this proposal back to the initiator. The initiator checks his own isakmpd.policy, to make sure that the selected proposal indeed agrees with his local policy.
In our QoSS demo we want a different local policy to be enforced in the QoSS aware peer, which acts as the initiator, for medium and high security level (for low security level we do not require any IPsec processing). As in the case of isakmpd.conf, we are using a predefined set of alternate IKE local security policies that describe the characteristics we want our SAs to have for each security level and we make active the proper isakmpd.policy file through our QoSS module.
The different local policy files we are using can be seen in Figures 8 and 9 . The main difference of these files is that the isakmpd.policy for medium security level requires DES as the encryption algorithm for telnet traffic and MD5 as the authentication algorithm for finger, whilst isakmpd.policy for high security level requires 3DES and SHA for the respective cases.
KeyNote-Version: 2 Authorizer: "POLICY" Licensees: "passphrase:mekmitasdigoat" Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy" && ( (esp_present == "yes") && ( ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && (esp_enc_alg == "des") ) ) || ( (ah_present == "yes") && ( ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") ) ) -> "true";
Figure 8: isakmpd.policy on Initiator for medium security level
KeyNote-Version: 2 Authorizer: "POLICY" Licensees: "passphrase:mekmitasdigoat" Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy" && ( (esp_present == "yes") && ( ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && (esp_enc_alg == "3des") ) ) || ( (ah_present == "yes") && ( ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") ) ) -> "true"; The local policy file for the responder can be seen in Figure 10 . For SAs to be successfully established for any security level of the initiator, the responder's policy should be broad enough to accept the different possible proposals. So this IPsec node accepts both DES and 3DES as encryption algorithms and both MD5 and SHA as authentication algorithms.
KeyNote-Version: 2 Authorizer: "POLICY" Licensees: "passphrase:mekmitasdigoat" Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy" && ( (esp_present == "yes") && ( ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && ( (esp_enc_alg == "des") || (esp_enc_alg == "3des") ) ) ) || ( (ah_present == "yes") && ( ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && ( (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") || (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") ) ) ) -> "true"; 
Bringing it All Together: QoSS Management Module
The events that control isakmpd consist of negotiation initiations from a remote party, user input via a FIFO or by signals, up-calls from the kernel via a PF_KEY socket, and lastly by scheduled events triggered by timers running out ( Figure 11 ) [14] . From these methods, of special interest for our demo is the user input by signals or via a FIFO. We may send signals to the IKE daemon. Currently two such signals are implemented:
• SIGUSR1, which generate a report, with status information of the daemon
• SIGHUP, which re-initializes isakmpd.
isakmpd.conf is read when the IKE daemon is first started and configuration information is loaded into the daemon's memory for use in generation of SA proposals. isakmpd will reread the configuration file when sent a SIGHUP signal.
Similarly isakmpd.policy is read when isakmpd is first started, and every time it receives a SIGHUP signal. The new policies read will be used for all new Phase 2 SAs established from that point on (even if the associated Phase 1 SA was already established when the new policies were loaded). The policy change will not affect already established Phase 2 SAs [12] .
So if we change isakmpd.conf and/or isakmpd.policy files and sent a kill -HUP <PID of isakmpd process> the daemon will reread these files and take into account from now on the new information contained in them. The daemon's process ID is contained in /var/run/isakmpd.pid.
In order to control the daemon we can also send commands through a FIFO called isakmpd.fifo, which can be found in /var/run/isakmpd.fifo. The commands are one-letter codes followed by arguments [15] : c connect Establish a connection with a peer C configure Add or remove configuration entries.
D debug
Change logging level for a debug class r report
Report status information of the daemon t teardown
Teardown a connection
The last command is of special importance for our demo to address the problem of stopping already established phase 2 SAs when the QoSS policy has changed. When we write to the FIFO t <connection identifier> the daemon removes the pair of SAs associated with the connection from the SA databases and it also notifies the peer daemon that these SAs are no longer valid, so that he can also remove them from his databases. The use of this command and especially the naming conventions for connection identifiers are not well documented. Through experimentation we observed the following: -the first pair of SAs established (for incoming and outgoing traffic) is described by "Connection-0" -the second pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-1"
If the commands t Connection-0 t Connection-1 are issued to the isakmpd FIFO and a SIGHUP is sent to the daemon, then for subsequent traffic: -the third (chronologically) pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-1" -the fourth pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-2"
Again after the FIFO commands t Connection-1 t Connection-2 and a SIGHUP to the daemon -the fifth (chronologically) pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-2" -the sixth pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-3"
and so on.
The code for the QoSS Management Module can be seen in Figure 12 . This sh shell script file gives us an interface for changing security level and causing the necessary changes to the IPsec mechanism. The functionality of this module has as follows:
A menu is continuously displayed on the screen, which prompts the user to select a security level.
When low security level is selected, if the IKE daemon is not running, it is not necessary to take any action, since our system does not provide IPsec protection in low security level. If the daemon is running, then through the FIFO we tear down existing connections, and through ipsecadm utility we make sure that all SAs and rules are removed from IPsec databases.
When medium security level is selected, first of all we copy to isakmpd.conf the configuration data for medium level (contained in isakmpd.conf.medium) and to isakmpd.policy the local policy for medium security level (from isakmpd.policy.medium). Then all SAs and rules are removed from IPsec databases. Rules for the flows are loaded to the SPD and then if the daemon was not running we start it. If it was already running, we tear down existing connections through the FIFO (to make sure that the peer is notified) and we send a SIGHUP to the daemon to force it to read the new configuration and policy data. Logistics for forming the correct connection identifier are kept.
Similarly when high security level is selected, first of all we copy to isakmpd.conf the configuration data for high level (contained in isakmpd.conf.high) and to isakmpd.policy the local policy for high security level (from isakmpd.policy.high). The rest of the steps are similar to those for the medium level.
NOTE: it should be noted that our demo always assumes that there are two pair of SAs established, one for telnet and one for finger traffic, so whenever there is a security level change, it tries to delete all of them. This assumes that whenever we change mode, we then generate both telnet and finger traffic, before changing again level. The akward logistics for the connection index forced this partial handling. A more complete approach would be to actually check how many SAs (through /kern/ipsec info, see next section) are currently established and tear down connections accordingly.
#=================================================================== s_banner() # Creates a banner for User Menus #=================================================================== { clear echo ` date` echo "" echo "__________________________________________" echo "" echo " SECURITY LEVEL MENU " echo "__________________________________________" echo "" } #=================================================================== s_menu() # Displays the menu #=================================================================== { echo "" echo "\tPlease select Security Level:\t\t\t\t****************" echo "\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t*\t\t\t\t*" echo "\t\t 1. LOW\t\t\t\t\t\t* SECURITY LEVEL:\t"$NETWORK_MODE"\t*" echo "\t\t 2. MEDIUM\t\t\t\t\t*\t\t\t\t*" echo "\t\t 3. HIGH\t\t\t\t\t*********************************" echo "\t\t" echo "\t\t 0. Cancel" echo "" echo "\tSelect by pressing a number and then ENTER : " } #=================================================================== s_low() # Calls Low things #=================================================================== { if [ $NETWORK_MODE != "Low" ] then echo "changing mode to LOW" NETWORK_MODE="Low" echo "Entered LOW actions" if s_daemon_runs then echo "t Connection-"$CONN_INDEX echo "t Connection-"$CONN_INDEX > /var/run/isakmpd.fifo echo "t Connection-"$(($CONN_INDEX+1)) echo "t Connection-"$(($CONN_INDEX+1)) > /var/run/isakmpd.fifo 
Generating and Displaying Traffic
The negotiation for establishment of SAs begins when traffic, for which there are rules in the SPD requiring IPsec processing, appears, but the appropriate SAs cannot be found in the SAD.
So in order to trigger the whole process, these commands can be issued at the initiator: telnet w.x.y.z for telnet traffic finger root@w.x.y.z for finger traffic We can observe traffic among the two peers by issuing the command below:
tcpdump -N -v host a.b.c.d and w.x.y.z tcpdump prints the headers of the packets on a network interface that match a boolean expression [16] , in our case the packets exchanged among the two IPsec nodes. When no IPsec processing is applied, the tcpdump output can be seen in Figure 13 , where various info for the packets is visible, among them the application names. When IPsec is used for the packets (in medium and high security levels), from the tcpdump output (Figure 14) we can only tell whether it is an ESP or AH packet. Ping packets still go in clear, since our policy does not require any IPsec processing for them. A GUI network protocol analyzer, like Ethereal, could also bee used. Ethereal allows interactive browsing of packet data from a live network. Like other protocol analyzers, its main window shows 3 views of a packet. It shows a summary line, briefly describing what the packet is. A protocol tree is shown, which allows to drill down to exact protocol or field of interest. Finally, a hex dump shows exactly what the packet looks like when it goes over the wire [17] . When packets are captured certain filters can be used for selecting the traffic of interest. The Filters dialog allows the creation and modification of filters. So we should create a new filter for capturing the traffic among the hosts we are interested by defining as Filter string: host <initiator-host-name> and <responder-host-name>
Displaying the Contents of Security Association Database
As mentioned in [4] "in each IPsec implementation there is a nominal Security Association Database, in which each entry defines the parameters associated with one SA. Each SA has an entry in the SAD. For outbound processing, entries are pointed to by entries in the SPD. Note that if an SPD entry does not currently point to an SA that is appropriate for the packet, the implementation creates an appropriate SA (or SA Bundle) and links the SPD entry to the SAD entry. For inbound processing, each entry in the SAD is indexed by a destination IP address, IPsec protocol type, and SPI." An SAD entry would include the fields: Destination IP address, IPsec protocol (AH or ESP), Security Parameter Index (SPI), Sequence counter, Sequence overflow flag, Anti-replay window info, AH type and info, ESP type and info, Lifetime info, Tunnel/transport mode flags, Path MTU info (Figure 15 ). In OpenBSD SAD entries can be set manually with the ipsecadm utility, or through automatic key exchange daemons, like IKE daemon and Photuris. The SAD is referred to as TDB or TDB table throughout OpenBSD's IPsec source code.
A list of all security associations in the kernel tables can be obtained via the kernfs file <ipsec> (typically in </kern/ipsec> ). In order to access this file, kernfs should first be mounted, through the command: mount -t kernfs /kern /kern This file is continually updated by the kernel and a listing of its typical contents (obtained through the command cat /kern/ipsec) can be seen in Figure 16 . The listing displays four SAs currently established and a description of their characteristics. The script program of Figure 18 parses the /kern/ipsec file and displays information for current SAs in a more compact format as can be seen below ( Figure 17 ).
********************************************************************* * SAs currently used and their ALGORITHMS * ********************************************************************* TIME: 10:21:57
********************************************************************* * SAs currently used and their ALGORITHMS * ********************************************************************* TIME: 10:22:11 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- , DES ********************************************************************* * SAs currently used and their ALGORITHMS * ********************************************************************* TIME: 10:22:25 More specifically the main routine every 2 seconds generates a copy file of /kern/ipsec (since we cannot process directly the kernfs file), and calls an awk routine to process it. The output screen is cleared every 3 rd time the routine is called, so up to two successive "instances" of /kern/ipsec are displayed on the same screen.
The awk routine parses the file with the copied contents of /kern/ipsec, searching for specific info for each SA, like: SPI of SA, Destination IP of SA, IPsec protocol, and algorithm. It performs the search, based on the fact that the kernel output has a standard format, so certain info appears in the same position within an SA description:
We have defined in our awk routine that a field is a sequence of characters separated by the next one by a space or a newline. A line like the one below
Hashmask: x, policy entries: y is always part of the first SA description in the kernel output, therefore the first SA description has the above extra 4 fields. So, an ESP SA description consists of 54 fields, if it is the first in the kernel output, and the IPsec protocol information will appear on the 13 th field and the algorithm in the 34 th for example. For a subsequent ESP SA description there is a total of 50 fields, with the protocol information appearing on the 9 th field and the algorithm in the 30 th . So depending on the total number of fields in the SA description, we search on the proper position for the info of interest (Figure 18 ). #====================================================================== a_banner() # Creates a banner for /ipsec/kern output #====================================================================== { clear echo "*************************************************************" echo "* SAs currently used and their ALGORITHMS *" echo "*************************************************************" echo "" } #====================================================================== awk_routine() # Processes and displays /ipsec/kern output #====================================================================== { /usr/bin/awk ' BEGIN { FS = "[ \t]+"; RS = "" print "SA#" "\t" "IPsec-Protocol" "\t" "Destination" "\t" "SPI" "\t\t" "Algorithm" print "------------------------------------------------------------------------" } { if ( (NF == 54) || (NF == 51) ) { print NR "." "\t" testProto($13) "\t" $10 "\t" $7 "\t" testAlgorithm($34) } if ( (NF == 50) || (NF == 47) ) { print NR "." "\t" testProto($9) "\t" $6 "\t" 
Comprehensive Sequence of Demonstration Steps
The necessary files on each peer are:
Initiator:
• The file with the rules for the SPD in /root: vpn28_ah_a
•
The QoSS management module in /root: level28_fifo
• The configuration and policy files in /etc/isakmpd: isakmpd.conf.medium isakmpd.conf.high isakmpd.policy.medium isakmpd.policy.high
Responder:
• The SA display script in /root: awk_SA
The configuration and policy files in /etc/isakmpd: isakmpd.conf isakmpd.policy
The necessary actions on each peer are:
• Mount kernfs: mount -t kernfs /kern /kern B. AFTERBOOT steps 1) check all applicable steps described in the afterboot man page 2) make sure that you run the hostname command 3) in /etc/sysctl.conf make sure that the IPsec protocols are enabled. The lines below should be uncommented: net.inet.esp.enable = 1 net.inet.ah.enable = 1
C. COPY SOURCE TREE FROM CD 1) if it doesn't exist, create directory where cdrom will be mounted mkdir -p /cdrom 2) insert OpenBSD CD 1 3) mount the cdrom device mount -t cd9660 /dev/cd0a /cdrom 4) go to the directory where the source tree will be created cd /usr/src 5) untar and unzip source file tar xvfz /cdrom/src.tar.gz D. UPDATE SOURCE from CVS TO 2.9-stable Commands below given for csh 1) set method for accessing the anonymous CVS server setenv CVS_RSH /usr/bin/ssh 2) set the anonymous CVS server setenv CVSROOT anoncvs@anoncvs5.usa.openbsd.org:/cvs or anoncvs@anoncvs1.ca.openbsd.org:/cvs (or any other anonCVS server that responds at the moment. For a complete list, check http://www.openbsd.org/anoncvs.html. Make sure that the server supports ssh.) 3) setenv CVS_IGNORE_REMOTE_ROOT yes 4) cd /usr/src 5) cvs -t -d $CVSROOT up -rOPENBSD_2_9 -Pd and wait for it to finish downloading. E. UPDATE X11 -part I (OpenBSD CD 1 should still be mounted from steps C.1-3, otherwise repeat them) 1) cd /cdrom/2.8/packages/i386 2) install two necessary packages pkg_add -v tcl-8.3.2.tgz pkg_add -v tk-8.3.2.tgz
